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Abstract. 
This paper develops a model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic 
growth. In the model a dictator must spread the resources of the economy over his reign but 
faces mortality and political risk. The model shows that if the time horizon of the dictator 
decreases, either due to an increase of mortality risk or political risk, the economic growth 
rate decreases. The model predictions are supported by empirical evidence based on a three-
way fixed effects model including country, year and dictator fixed effects for a sample of 
dictators from 116 countries. These results are robust to sample selection, the tenure of 
dictators, the definition of dictatorship, and a broad set of economic growth determinants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Why do some dictatorships have higher economic growth rates than others? Since the 
contributions of Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996), the answer has been that 
dictators come in two types: “roving bandits” and “stationary bandits”. Roving bandits are 
dictators with high discount rates that expropriate as much as possible once they enter office, 
while stationary bandits expect to have long office duration. Since the latter cares about the 
future, he has an incentive to invest in growth enhancing policies and institutions.  
 
Dictator type is not exogenous. For example, dictators that rule in politically unstable 
countries are more likely to have shorter time horizons and therefore produce lower economic 
growth rates (see, for instance, Alesina et al., 1996 and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). In 
this paper we elaborate on the relationship between a dictator’s discount factor and his type. 
We argue that when dictators grow older, they care less about the future, because the 
probability of natural death increases. A dictator will start off as a stationary bandit but 
becomes a roving bandit as time passes by, simply because his time-horizon has decreased. 
Consequently, the age of a dictator partly determines whether he is roving or a stationary 
bandit and, hence, his age and economic growth are negatively related. 
  
To illustrate and formalize the argument, we develop a model in which a dictator optimizes 
his own utility by choosing between investments in capital goods and extracting rents. 
Whereas investments in capital goods will ensure higher national income and higher future 
utility, extracting rents from the economy increases instantaneous utility but comes at the cost 
of lower economic growth. Not surprisingly, the dictator will only invest in growth enhancing 
policies if he is likely to reap the benefits of future economic growth. Older dictators will, 
therefore, extract more than younger dictators. However, a dictator who cares about his heir 
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apparent will make sure to leave sufficient productive capital even if he faces a substantial 
mortality risk. 
 
We test our hypotheses using a panel data set of over 300 dictators around the world since the 
1950’s. More specifically, we employ the ARCHIGOS data set of Goemans et al. (2009) to 
examine marginal and long-run effects of aging taking into account the endogenous nature of 
political instability and unobserved country, time and dictator heterogeneity. We find 
compelling evidence for the main hypothesis that growth is negatively affected by the age of 
dictators. Adding one candle to the birthday cake of the dictator shaves 0.2 to 0.4 percentage 
points off the yearly economic growth rate. This effect is not driven by endogeneity due to 
sample selection or omitted variables bias. We also find that political instability has a 
significant negative impact on economic growth rates. In addition, we find tentative support 
for the existence of heir effects. That is, we find that the effect of aging on economic growth 
is smaller in dictatorships where succession of power is regulated within the family (i.e. 
monarchies) than in other dictatorships. 
 
The empirical results concerning political instability confirm earlier findings that show that 
political uncertainty harms economic growth rates (see Carmignani (2003) for a survey). The 
findings regarding the negative association of dictator age and economic growth are, to the 
best of our knowledge, novel, but add to a growing literature on personal characteristics of 
leaders and the policies they enact. For example, Jones and Olken (2005) show that the 
replacement of leaders leads to structural breaks in observed growth patterns. Besley et al. 
(2011) find that better educated leaders cause higher economic growth rates. Regarding 
defence policy, Horowitz et al. (2005) find that older leaders are more likely to initiate and 
escalate military conflicts. Dreher et al. (2009) show that former entrepreneurs are more 
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likely to enact market liberalizing reforms. In addition, our paper adds to the literature dealing 
with the political survival of authoritarian regimes (see Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; 
Gandhi, 2008).  
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section formalizes our main argument and 
introduces the empirical hypotheses. We describe the data in Section 3 and provide our 
empirical strategy in Section 4. The estimation results and various robustness analyses are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
  
2. Model and hypotheses 
We consider an all powerful dictator who reigns for two periods but transition between the 
periods is probabilistic. On the one hand, the dictator may die of natural causes; on the other 
hand, the dictator may be ousted from office. If he dies of natural causes he wants to leave the 
economy in such a state that his heir apparent, who may be a son but also someone else, 
inherits a sound economy. 
 
The production sector is characterized by a linear production technology that depends on the 
aggregate capital stock and the, fixed, level of technology. The production function is given 
by: =t tY AK , where tY  is aggregate output at time t , A  is the state of technology and tK  is 
the capital stock. From the perspective of a dictator who came into power at time t , tK  is the 
initial capital endowment. 
 
The dictator must decide how many consumption goods to extract from the economy every 
period. All productive assets that are not extracted as consumption goods may be used for 
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productive purposes in the next period. The discounted life-time utility function of a dictator 
who came into power at time t  is given by: 
 
21 1
1 2ln( ) (1 )(1 ) ln( ) (1 )(1 )(1 ) ln( ),t t t tC C Bθ θµ pi µ pi+ +Λ = + − − + − − −  (1) 
where tC  is consumption, 0 1pi< <  is the probability of being ousted from office in each 
period, 0 1µ< <  is the probability of dying of a natural cause before period 2, 1θ ≥  governs 
the preference attached to the heir apparent (see below) and 2+tB  is the bequest the dictator 
leaves to his heir apparent.1 In the second period of the dictator’s reign the utility function 
becomes: 
 
1
1 1 2ln( ) (1 )(1 ) ln( ),t t tC Bθ pi+ + +Λ = + − −  (2) 
and he essentially faces the problem of dividing the productive assets in the economy between 
current consumption and a bequest for his heir apparent. The dictator discounts the bequest by 
the probability of being ousted from office, pi , because he takes into account that upon his 
certain death someone else besides his heir apparent may seize power.  
 
As the dictator has full power over the economy, his optimization problem essentially is how 
to spread his initial capital endowment, tK , over his full reign. However, even though the 
dictator faces a mortality risk, µ , this does not imply that the country dies with him. 
Depending on his expectation concerning succession he attaches more or less utility to the 
capital left for his heir apparent. The more he values his heir apparent the higher is θ .  
 
                                                 
1
  If 1µ = Equation (1) collapses to a two period optimal bequest model as in Equation (2). In addition, if 
the dictator would reign for n  periods instead of 2 Equation (1) becomes: 
1 11 1ln( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ln( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ln( )
1 1 1 1 1
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, where 
both µ  and pi  may change over time. For sake of clarity we focus on the 2 period setting in the text. The 
hypothesis derived below are unchanged if we consider an n period setting. Naturally, if 1µ =  we would not be 
able to study the relation between growth and mortality. 
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Effectively θ  mitigates time discounting due to mortality. If 1θ = , Equation (1) collapses to 
the standard 2-period life-cycle model. However, if 1θ >  the standard model is generalized to 
allow for bequests. In the first period a higher θ  leads to less discounting of the mortality 
factor. That is, if θ  is high the dictator will invest more in period 1 because even if he is not 
around to consume the benefits from the investment his heir will be. In the second period θ  
acts to give utility value to bequests left for the heir apparent. The heir apparent uses the 
bequests received from the perished dictator as his initial capital endowment. Therefore, the 
dictator effectively chooses the level of capital that his heir apparent is endowed with and we 
can set 2 1+ +=t tB I , where 1+tI  is the amount of productive investments at time t . 
 
In addition to mortality risk, the dictator faces a probability, pi , of being ousted from office 
by, for instance, a coup. As the dictator attaches no value to the utility of a successor that 
ousted him from office θ  does not affect his time discounting due to uncertain political 
survival. That is, if the dictator knows that he will be ousted from office within one period 
(i.e. 1pi = ) the dictator will execute a policy of maximal extraction. On the other hand, if the 
dictator knows that he will perish ( 1µ = ) tomorrow he would still leave a substantial amount 
of productive assets to his heir apparent as initial endowment. Thus, political risk, pi , and 
mortality risk, µ , affect the dictator’s time horizon in a fundamentally different way. 
  
The dictator’s decision problem is constrained by the resource constraint. That is, aggregate 
output in both periods must be divided between consumption and productive investments: 
 
.t t tY C I= +  (3) 
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Assuming full depreciation of productive assets2 after each period allows us to write the 
capital accumulation function as 1t tK I+ =  so that we can write the resource constraint as: 
 1,t t tAK C K += +  (4) 
where we have substituted in the aggregate production function. 
 
A young dictator chooses combinations of tC , 1+tC  and 2+tB  such that (1) is maximized 
subject to (4). Similarly, an old dictator chooses combinations of 1+tC  and 2+tB  such that (2) 
is maximized subject to (4). From the maximization problems of the individual dictators the 
growth rate of the economy, 1 1+ ≡ +t t
t
Y gY , arises residually. Comparative statics on 1+ tg  
lead us to the following hypotheses concerning growth and dictators:3 
H.1 Growth decreases as the mortality rate of the dictator increases: (1 ) 0.
µ
∂ +
<
∂
tg
 
H.2 Growth decreases as the probability of a coup increases:  (1 ) 0.
pi
∂ +
<
∂
tg
 
H.3 Growth is higher if the dictator cares about his heir apparent:  (1 ) 0.
θ
∂ +
>
∂
tg
 
In the empirical analysis that follows we seek to determine whether our hypotheses are valid 
and how different factors affecting the time horizon of dictators affect the economic growth 
performance of dictatorships. 
 
3. Data 
                                                 
2
 Assuming that both periods cover 10 years and that the annual depreciation rate is 15% gives a 
compound depreciation rate over the full period of 80% ( 101 (1 .15)− − ) which is observationally close to full 
depreciation. 
3
 See Appendix A for the solution of the model and derivation of the comparative static effects. 
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Our dependent variable is taken from the Penn World Table (version 6.3) of Heston et al. 
(2009) and measures yearly real GDP growth per capita. Economic growth data for most 
countries is available from 1950 until 2007.4  
 
Our main explanatory variable is the age of a dictator (H.1). Data on the age of political 
leaders is obtained from the ARCHIGOS data set of Goemans et al. (2009). This data set 
includes information on both autocratic and democratic leaders up till 2004 and this 
demarcates the boundary of our sample. To identify autocratic leaders, we use the measure of 
Przeworski et al. (2000), who define an autocracy as a political regime where there is no 
reasonable probability that the incumbent power is replaced after an election (or where 
elections are absent).5  
 
Our sample consists of about 500 political leaders. These leaders have ruled (or still rule) in 
118 different countries. The average number of observations per leader is 9.2. That is, on 
average a dictator rules for 9.2 years (the median is 6.5 years). The youngest autocratic leader 
in the sample is Hussein Ibn Talal El-Hashim, who came into power at age 17 and remained 
the leader of Jordan for 46 years. Only Fidel Castro of Cuba has an equally long tenure, 
although he came into power at age 33. The distribution of age is normal according to a 
Jarque Bera test (see Appendix B for descriptive statistics and data sources).  
 
                                                 
4
  Hanousek et al. (2008) and  Johnson et al. (2009) criticize the use of the Penn World Table for time 
series cross-country analysis. We acknowledge this criticism and use the economic growth variable provided by 
the World Development Indicators of the World Bank for robustness (see column 5 of table 6). 
5
  This measure has the advantage that it provides a clear dichotomy between democracies and 
autocracies. However, the strict division between democracies and autocracies comes at the cost that some 
democracies (e.g. South Africa) are labeled as autocracy, since even though the political process is democratic, 
the opposition has no reasonable chance to take power (a discussion can be found in Cheibub et al., 2010). To 
check whether our results depend on the choice of democracy indicator, we also use the Polity index of Marshall 
and Jaggers (2011) to test for robustness (see column 6 of table 6). 
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In figure 1a we explore the relation between the age of dictators and economic growth. We 
show the difference in average economic growth for dictators when they are young and when 
they are old. That is, we compare the economic growth performance of dictators during the 
first and second half of their reign. It can be seen that, on average, economic growth is higher 
in the first half than in the second half. In figure 1b, we show the same relation, but now only 
for dictators that have been in power for at least 20 years. The figure illustrates that the 
relation between age and economic growth is even stronger for dictators that have been in 
power for such a long period. Although the figures give support to H.1, we turn to a more 
thorough analysis below. That is, whilst in figure 1 we focus on a strict two-period 
interpretation of the model, in the empirical analysis we focus on its n-period equivalent. 
 
[Insert figure 1a and 1b here] 
 
To examine the impact of political instability on economic growth (H.2), we have to take into 
account that the political survival rate is likely to be endogenous as political instability may 
not only a determinant of economic growth, but also a consequence of (the lack of) economic 
growth. Therefore, we follow earlier work by, e.g., Alesina et al. (1996) who estimate a 
parsimonious limited dependent variable (logit) model to predict the probability of a coup 
attempt in a given country in a given year.6 The variables we employ to predict the probability 
of a coup attempt are GDP per capita, the number of past coup attempts and successful coups 
d’etat, the level of democracy, the duration of the political regime, and country fixed effects 
to capture all time invariant observed and unobserved country specific characteristics. It 
should be noted here that our aim is not to analyze why in some countries more coup d’etats 
are attempted than in other countries. Instead, our aim is to come up with a solid prediction of 
                                                 
6
 Data on coup attempts are taken from Powell and Thyne (2010). 
 10 
the probability of a coup attempt on the basis of a small set of predetermined variables. The 
estimation results can be found in table 1.  
 
[insert table 1 here] 
 
It can be seen that almost all included predictors of coup attempts enter the regression 
significantly. To further evaluate the predictive power of the model, we calculate the 
sensitivity measure (the probability of positive prediction given that there has been an 
attempt) and the specificity measure (the probability of a negative prediction given that there 
has been no attempt) and find that these measures are 65 percent and 75 percent, respectively. 
That is, in about 70 percent of all coup attempts, the model rightly predicts the occurrence of 
a coup attempt. When testing H.2, we always use the exogenously predicted probability of a 
coup attempt. 
 
To study the relation between having an heir and economic growth (H.3), we encounter the 
challenge of quantifying the existence of heirs. The problem arises that the heritage of 
political power can only be observed ex-post. That is, only when the son (or other family 
member) indeed succeeds the dictator, we are sure that succession occurs within the family. 
Naturally, such a measure gives an incomplete picture of the extent to which a dictator cares 
about his heir. Alternatively, one could argue that dictators with children care more about the 
future than dictators without children. Ludwig (2004) provides accurate data on the number of 
children of dictators. We updated this data set but conclude that almost all dictators have 
children, leading to a lack of variation in the data to identify an heir effect. In the analysis 
below, we therefore use another proxy to study the heir effect using the notion that not every 
dictatorship is alike. Cheibub et al. (2010) provide a typology of dictatorships and 
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differentiate between civilian dictatorships, military dictatorships, and monarchic 
dictatorships. We expect that especially in monarchic dictatorships rulers will care about the 
future as it is almost certain that the successor is a child (or another close relative). This is not 
to say that in other dictatorships succession does not happen within the family. However, 
monarchic dictatorships are the only type of dictatorships where family succession is 
institutionalized and therefore we consider it more likely that a ruler will care about his heirs 
in this type of political system.  Table 2 shows that leaders in civilian dictatorships are, on 
average, not younger or older than those in military or monarchic dictatorships. However, 
these statistics are unable to capture the dynamics over a life-cycle of a dictator with respect 
to the economic performance of a dictator. To that end, we now turn to an in-depth empirical 
analysis. 
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
4. Estimation Strategy 
To test the theoretical predictions of section 2, we estimate a three-way panel fixed effects 
regression model, which, in its most general form, is written as:7 
 
, , , , , , ,i j t i j t i j t i t i j tg X Zα γ δ ε= + + + + +β φ
 (5) 
where 
, ,i j tg  is the yearly economic growth rate achieved in country i  by dictator j  at time t . 
α , γ , and δ  are country fixed effects, dictator fixed effects and year fixed effects, 
respectively.8 Z  is a vector of country specific control variables, β  and φ  are vectors of 
                                                 
7
 Our choice for a static fixed effects model and not a dynamic fixed effects model is based on Wald tests 
for the appropriate lag structure of the model. As shown in the sensitivity analysis, there is no reason to believe 
that the underlying process is dynamic. Yet, relaxing the restriction of the non-existence of a lagged dependent 
variable does not change our results (see column 1 of table 6). 
8
  We test for the presence of these effects using F-test on the different groups of effects. In all 
specifications, the null-hypothesis of no effects is rejected at the 1 per cent significance level (results are 
available upon request). 
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regression parameters and ε  is the error term which is assumed to be random.9 X  is a vector 
of explanatory variable(s) corresponding to the hypothesis under consideration. In particular, 
X β  is equal to: 
 1 ,β × j tAge  for H.1 
 1 ,( )β × i tP Coup attempt  for H.2 
 1 ,β × j tAge  for subsamples with and without monarchies for H.3 
The fixed effects in our model capture all variance specific to individual countries, dictators 
and years, respectively. Country fixed effects control for all variables that are specific to a 
country such as the availability of natural resources or geographical characteristics, whereas 
year fixed effects control for global economic shocks such as the oil crises in 1973 and 1979. 
We include dictator fixed effects to control for individual characteristics of dictators. For 
instance, dictators that enter office at a relatively high age may have better managerial skills 
than dictators that enter office at a relatively young age. Better managerial skills may affect 
economic growth, but are unrelated to the effect of age on economic growth due to a shorter 
time horizon. The dictator fixed effects control for unobserved characteristics of the dictator 
that do not vary over his term in office (such as the initial level of managerial skills). This 
implies that for our main analysis we focus on the variation in the data “within” dictators and, 
hence, that we examine the impact of age when an individual dictator grows older.  
 
Naturally, estimating a reduced form equation involves issues of endogeneity. We find that in 
our context endogeneity may arise as a consequence either of attrition (selection bias) or 
omitted variables. The attrition bias may result from the fact that leaders can drop from the 
sample as a consequence of poor economic performance. So that we may observe low 
                                                 
9
  In principle, a vector Wj,t exists containing time varying dictator specific variables. For the baseline 
regression, we assume that this vector is contained in the error term. In section 5.2 we relax this assumption and 
study the confounding effect of tenure in the relation between the age of the dictator and economic growth. 
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economic growth rates in the final stage of their term. To address this potential problem, we 
also provide estimates for our model in which we select the sample of dictators of which their 
term ended because of exogenous reasons. We follow Besley et al. (2011) by focusing on 
leaders that either died of natural reasons or were incapacitated by illness.  By doing so, we 
are confident that our results are not driven by sample selection. After all, lower economic 
growth rates do not cause natural deaths or disease.  
 
We include a set of standard control variables in the regressions to control for endogeneity 
resulting from omitted variables bias. These variables include the ratio of total investments to 
GDP, the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, economic openness, i.e., total trade 
relative to GDP and the presence of civil war.10 With the end of the cold war a lot of countries 
(especially post-communist countries) experienced a structural break in their economic 
performance. As this structural break correlates with time (and so does aging), we include a 
dummy variable that is equal to one in the period up to 1990 and zero afterwards.  
 
5. Estimation Results 
The predictions of our theoretical model are tested in table 3, where we present the estimation 
results of the fixed effects model as presented in equation 5. Column 1 contains the results for 
H.1, i.e., that the economic growth rate declines as dictators grow older. Column 2 presents 
the results for H.2, i.e., the impact of political instability on economic growth. In column 3, 
we test H.1 and H.2 simultaneously. Finally, columns 4 and 5 show the estimates of the 
subsample containing monarchies and the sample without monarchies, thereby testing H.3. 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
                                                 
10
 Note that due to the inclusion of fixed effects and the focus on yearly economic growth rates, we 
exclude all variables that are time invariant or are only able to explain long term growth differences (such as the 
level of human capital or the level of national income at the beginning of the sample period.) 
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We find strong support for H.1. The point estimate is negative and significant at the 1 percent  
level with a t-statistic of 8.2. In addition to statistical significance, we also find the effect to be 
highly economically significant. That is, a one year increase in the age of the dictator reduces 
economic growth by 0.4 percentage points. Moreover, the variance explained by the model is 
0.21 as indicated by the R-squared statistic. 
We also find that the probability of a coup attempt has a negative impact on economic 
growth, thereby lending support for H.2.11 This effect is also significant at the 1 percent level 
and is in line with earlier findings in the literature (see, for instance, Alesina et al., 1996). In 
column 3 we show that H.1 and H.2 are not mutually exclusive. When we enter the age of the 
dictator as well as political instability into the regression, both estimates remain significant at 
the 1 per cent level. Hence, we conclude that mortality risk and political risk are not mutually 
exclusive. 
 
The results in columns 4 and 5 tentatively support the hypothesis that family succession 
affects the economic growth performance of dictators (i.e. H.3). The impact of aging is 
significant in both samples. However, when we compare the estimates of aging for the sample 
with and without monarchies, we find that the impact of aging is smaller in monarchic 
dictatorships (-0.30 vs. -0.41), while the estimated standard errors are 0.09 and 0.05, 
respectively.12 
  
5.1 Endogeneity 
                                                 
11
  In going from column 1 to 2 the estimation sample is reduced due to lower data availability for political 
instability. However, when we test H.1 for the reduced sample our results are unchanged. 
12
  As explained in section 3, an alternative way to test this hypothesis is to include the presence of children 
as explanatory variable in the regression. Whilst examining  this alternative, we were confronted with the fact 
that almost all dictators have children leading to negligible variation in the data. Ignoring this caveat and 
estimating the regression anyway, we do not find evidence that the presence of children matters.   
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Our finding that aging of dictators is a determinant of economic growth may suffer from 
selection bias as pointed out in section 4. That is, dictators may drop from the sample as a 
consequence of poor economic performance, so that we observe low economic growth rates in 
the final stage of their term. In order to control for this problem, we estimate our model for 
the sample of dictators whose term ended because of exogenous reasons. As most dictators 
leave office for different reasons than natural death or disease, we are left with a relative 
small sample of 27 dictators and 371 country-year-dictator observations. When we test H.1. 
and H.2 for this smaller sample, we confirm our earlier findings. This result is reported in 
column 1 of table 4. Age enters the regression with an estimated parameter of -0.16 and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. Political instability enters the regression with an estimated 
parameter of -0.81 and is also significant at the 5 per cent level. Furthermore, the R-squared 
of the model is 0.19, which close to our baseline specification.13  
 
[insert table 4 here] 
 
The other potential endogeneity problem is that variables exist that are correlated with the age 
of the dictator and are also a determinant of economic growth. This phenomenon is called 
omitted variables bias. We test the robustness of our results for H.1 and H.2 by including 
control variables. We include these control variables separately first and in column 8 we 
include all control variables. In the next sub-section we focus on one confounding variable in 
particular, namely the tenure of a dictator. In line with earlier studies on the determinants of 
economic growth, we expect that investments and openness will enter with a positive sign, 
while we expect the size of government, violence indicators and population growth will enter 
with a negative sign. 
                                                 
13
  H.3 cannot be tested since only 10 monarchic dictators were randomly replaced. These are: Isa Ibn Al-
Khalifa of Bahrein, Wangchuk of Bhutan, Hussein of Jordan, As-Sabah of Kuwait, Mohammed V and Hassan II 
of Morocco, Tribhuvan and Mahendra of Nepal, Khalid and Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Subhuza II of Swaziland. 
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The variables we have included as controls are all of the expected sign. However, only the 
ratio of government expenditures to GDP and the presence of civil war enter the regression 
significantly. In our view, this can largely be explained by the inclusion of country fixed 
effects that takes away the cross-sectional variation in the data. Yet, such a saturated model 
confirms our earlier findings that the age of the dictator and political instability are 
determinants of economic growth. Finally, in column 9 we consider both sources of 
endogeneity simultaneously by estimating the saturated model of column 8 for the sample of 
leaders that left office for exogenous reasons. The column highlights that the results remain 
largely unchanged.  
 
5.2 The effect of tenure  
With every year that the dictator grows older, he also gains an additional year of tenure. 
Clague et al. (1996) claim that there is a positive relation between tenure of a dictator and 
economic growth. Their argument relates to Olson’s theory that there are roving and 
stationary dictators (Olson, 1993). While the former have a short time horizon, the latter have 
a much longer time horizon. Hence, a dictator that is observed to have a long tenure is more 
likely to be a stationary bandit, and, therefore, more likely to have a positive growth 
performance. The argument of Clague et al. (1996) contrasts the predictions of our model. 
  
The inclusion of dictator fixed effects in the empirical model comes at the cost that it is not 
innocuous to differentiate between age and tenure of the dictator. Conditional on the dictator 
fixed effect, these variables are perfectly collinear. In order to examine this issue, we can still 
make use of the cross-sectional variation between leaders within countries. In other words, we 
can exploit the fact that dictators come to power at a different age. For example, King Hussein 
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of Jordan entered office at age 17, whereas his son Abdullah entered office at age 37. Put 
differently, at age 40 Hussein’s tenure was 23 years, while Abdullah’s was 3. In terms of our 
empirical strategy focusing on variation between dictators implies that we have to drop 
dictator fixed effects. 
 
Table 5 shows the effect of age and tenure on economic growth. In column 1, we re-estimate 
specification 7 of table “controls” without dictator fixed effects. We find that the age 
parameter is -0.08 and still significant. It is important to note that the omission of dictator 
fixed effects changes the interpretation of the estimated coefficient. While the baseline 
regression gives a marginal effect (i.e, the effect of becoming one year older), the current 
specification gives an absolute effect (i.e., the effect of a given age on economic growth). In 
column 2 we estimate the same specification as in column 1, but replace age by tenure. The 
results indicate that tenure by itself does not affect economic growth. Thus, refuting the 
prediction of Clague et al. (1996) that tenure is positively related to economic growth.14 In 
column 3 we include both age and tenure in the regression and find that only age is estimated 
significantly. However, we observe that tenure is now estimated, as predicted by Clague et al. 
(1996) with a positive coefficient albeit not significant. The exercise in table 5 allows to 
conclude that while there are theoretical grounds for tenure to have an impact on economic 
growth, this relationship does not confound the relation between aging dictators and economic 
growth. 
   
[Insert table 5 here] 
 
5.3 Further robustness analyses 
                                                 
14
  Note that the specification in column 2 contains one additional observation. This is due to the fact that 
in 1969 Brazil was ruled by a military junta with no specific head of government. 
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In table 6 we provide additional tests for robustness. In column 1, we include a lagged 
dependent variable in the regression to check whether economic growth follows an 
autoregressive process. It can be seen that there is no evidence for such a dynamic process 
and, more importantly, that the sign and significance of the age coefficient is unaffected by 
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In column 2 we examine whether our results for 
H.1 are driven by outliers. We exclude observations for which the economic growth is higher 
than 30 percent per year and lower than -30 percent per year. Our results do not change when 
we exclude outliers from the sample.15 In column 3 we focus on 5-year economic growth rates 
as the dependent variables. This also allows us to include a convergence effect in to the 
regression model (i.e., begin of period GDP). We find that examining the effect of age over a 
longer time span does not change our main finding. In column 4 we use investments instead 
of economic growth as the dependent variable. According to our theoretical model, 
investments are the channel through which the age of the dictator affects economic growth. 
The results confirm the earlier findings; age enters negative and significant. In column 5 we 
use an alternative data source for our dependent variable. That is, we use the economic 
growth variable from the World Development Indicators of the Worldbank (2011). Even 
though the point estimate of the age coefficient is smaller than in the baseline regression, it is 
still negative and significant at the 5 percent level.16 In column 6 we use the Polity IV data set 
instead of the Przeworski et al. (2000) measure to select the sample of dictators. We follow 
the Polity handbook and classify all regimes with a score lower than 7 as an autocracy. The 
alternative sample selection criterion does not change our main finding. Finally, in figure 2, 
we visualize the marginal effect of age when we estimate the model including also age 
squared to evaluate the existence of non-linearity. As can be seen by the downward sloping 
curve, the marginal effect of age increases as the age of the dictator increases. 
                                                 
15
  Estimating the model for alternative thresholds yields the same results. 
16
  Using data of Maddison (2003) provides us the same conclusion. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
As dictators grow older, their time-horizon decreases. We show in a simple model that a 
decrease in the time-horizon of a dictator leads to less investments in productive capital and, 
therefore, less economic growth. This effect is supported by empirical estimates using a 
sample of about 500 dictators for the period between 1950 and 2004. Our evidence supports 
the view that dictators discount the future when it comes to growth promoting policies. 
Complementing the literature that focuses on the risk of political replacement (i.e., political 
instability) and economic growth, we find evidence that the risk of natural death has an effect 
on economic growth as well. We find some evidence for heir effects on economic growth. 
That is, we find that for the sample of monarchic dictatorships the estimated impact of age is 
smaller than for other dictatorships. These findings should, however, be interpreted with care 
since the differences are small. In addition, the distinction between monarchic dictatorships 
and other dictatorships is a crude proxy to measure heir effects and deserves further 
examination. 
 
An interesting direction for future research is to look beyond age and focus on the relationship 
between personal attributes of dictators and the policies that they enact. Becker and Mulligan 
(1994), for instance, argue that, in addition to mortality, wealth, addictions, uncertainty and 
numerous other variables affect the future time horizon of individuals. Combining their 
analysis with our empirical strategy and the rich dataset of Ludwig (2004) could shed light on 
how, for instance, drug and alcohol use affect the enacted policies. Alternatively, a fruitful 
area for future research is to study how shocks to longevity affect the polices enacted by 
dictators. Hugo Chavez is an interesting point in this respect and it should be interesting to 
examine whether his cancer diagnose caused a structural break in his economic policies. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of economic growth between first and second half of tenure of 
dictator. 
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Figure 1b. Dictators with at least 20 years tenure. 
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Figure 2. Non-linearity of the age effect. 
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Note: the figure shows the estimated marginal effect (and the 95 per cent confidence interval) 
of age on economic growth based on a model specification including age and age squared. 
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Table 1. Predicting coup attempts 
 
Dependent variable: coup attempt 
 GDP -0.580*** 
 
(-2.59) 
Previous coup attempts (number of) -0.337*** 
 
(-4.89) 
Previous successful coup attempts (number of) 0.218* 
 
(1.87) 
Regime duration -0.00381 
 
(-0.54) 
Democracy -1.001*** 
 
(-5.06) 
Constant 2.028 
 
(1.33) 
Countries  77 
Observations 3,658 
Note: the model is estimated using logit. Country and year fixed effects are included.  
Z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 2. Age and economic growth in different dictatorships 
 
Dictatorship: Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Civilian Age 1825 57.26 11.33 21 92 
 
Growth 1752 1.97 9.43 -65.08 88.73 
Military Age 1307 52.16 10.57 27 84 
 
Growth 1274 1.59 8.60 -42.90 123.27 
Monarchic Age 504 51.07 15.20 17 84 
  Growth 447 2.09 11.13 -27.35 134.13 
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Table 3. Baseline estimation results 
 
Dependent variable: 
economic growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
growth growth growth growth growth 
Age -0.434*** 
 
-0.185** -0.300*** -0.406*** 
 
(-8.200) 
 
(-2.586) (-9.085) (-7.437) 
Political instability 
 
-0.682*** -0.682*** 
  
  
(-2.771) (-2.771) 
  Constant 14.08*** 20.24*** 25.31*** -9.487*** 15.15*** 
 
(5.973) (3.564) (4.100) (-9.747) (4.290) 
Observations 3,499 2,355 2,354 411 3,088 
R-squared 0.212 0.234 0.234 0.203 0.235 
Countries 116 76 76 15 116 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Leader fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: model is estimated using panel fixed effects. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Aging, economic growth and endogeneity 
Note: model is estimated using panel fixed effects. Columns 1 and 9 are based on a sample of leaders that left office for exogenous reasons (see 
Besley et al. (2011). Columns 2-8 are based on the full sample. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Dependent variable: economic growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age -0.162** -0.219*** -0.172** -0.217** -0.358*** -0.185** -0.198** -0.228** -0.521** 
 
(-2.073) (-2.862) (-2.565) (-2.338) (-4.743) (-2.586) (-2.560) (-2.531) (-2.377) 
Political instability -0.811** -0.678*** -0.557** -0.696*** -0.639** -0.682*** -0.678*** -0.520** -0.768* 
 
(-2.327) (-2.847) (-2.494) (-2.733) (-2.587) (-2.771) (-2.717) (-2.279) (-2.058) 
Investments (% of GDP) 
 
0.150 
     
0.163 0.0636 
  
(0.920) 
     
(1.208) (0.400) 
Government expenditures (% of GDP) 
  
-0.303*** 
    
-0.297*** -0.217** 
   
(-3.034) 
    
(-2.941) (-2.479) 
Openness (total trade as a % of GDP) 
   
0.0239 
   
0.00598 0.0186 
    
(0.550) 
   
(0.192) (0.473) 
Civil war dummy 
    
-3.861** 
  
-3.973** -7.431*** 
     
(-2.425) 
  
(-2.339) (-3.083) 
Cold war dummy 
     
-6.327 
 
5.988 -13.35 
      
(-1.219) 
 
(1.525) (-1.687) 
Population growth rate 
      
-19.70 -19.32 0.297 
       
(-1.323) (-1.154) (0.0130) 
Constant 23.34*** 25.17*** 27.88*** 25.63*** 25.02*** 23.71*** 27.06*** 19.54*** 49.12*** 
 
(3.453) (4.117) (4.536) (3.990) (4.258) (4.256) (3.891) (3.654) (2.967) 
Observations 371 2,354 2,354 2,354 2,301 2,354 2,261 2,210 354 
R-squared 0.199 0.239 0.249 0.236 0.234 0.234 0.233 0.247 0.234 
Countries 26 76 76 76 76 76 73 73 25 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Leader fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 5. The effect of tenure on economic growth 
 
Dependent variable: economic growth (1) (2) (3) 
Age -0.0799** 
 
-0.0933** 
 
(-2.333) 
 
(-2.022) 
Tenure 
 
-0.0404 0.0308 
  
(-1.130) (0.603) 
Observations 2,210 2,211 2,210 
R-squared 0.070 0.066 0.070 
Countries 73 73 73 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Leader fixed effects NO NO NO 
Note: model is estimated using panel fixed effects. The specification include control variables 
(see column 8 of table 4) which are omitted for clarity. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Further robustness analyses 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Specification check: Dynamic Outliers Growth 5-year Investments Growth WDI Polity IV 
Age -0.0864** -0.391*** -0.00380** -0.0779*** -0.0772** -0.417*** 
 
(-2.289) (-7.468) (-2.058) (-3.518) (-2.059) (-8.125) 
Lagged economic growth 0.0231 
     
 
(0.286) 
     Begin of period GDP 
  
-0.326* 
   
   
(-1.793) 
   Constant 4.015* 12.84*** 2.847** 3.945*** 4.807* 12.46*** 
 
(1.744) (5.255) (2.101) (2.907) (1.839) (5.234) 
Observations 3,422 3,450 511 3,499 2,543 3,235 
R-squared 0.215 0.174 0.557 0.086 0.200 0.204 
Countries 116 116 112 116 104 115 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Leader fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: model is estimated using panel fixed effects. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix A. Model solution and comparative statics 
 
By substituting the constraints into the utility function we can write the optimization program 
of a young dictator as:17 
 
2 3
1
1 1 2 2 3
,
21
3
max ln( ) (1 )(1 ) ln( )
(1 )(1 )(1 ) ln( ),
K K
AK K AK K
K
θ
θ
µ pi
µ pi
Λ = − + − − −
+ − − −
 (A.1) 
with 1K  given.  
The first order necessary conditions are: 
 
1
1
2 1 2 2 3
(1 )(1 )10 : 0,A
K AK K AK K
θ µ pi− −∂Λ
= − + =
∂ − −  (A.2) 
 
21 1
1
3 2 3 3
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )0 : 0.
K AK K K
θ θµ pi µ pi− − − − −∂Λ
= − + =
∂ −  (A.3) 
We can rewrite (A.2) and (A.3) as: 
 
1
2 3 1 2(1 )(1 ) ( ),AK K A AK Kθ µ pi− = − − −  (A.4) 
 
1 1
3 2 3(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )( ).K AK Kθ θµ µ pi− = − − − −  (A.5) 
Defining output growth, 1g , in period 1 as 2 1
1
1Y gY ≡ +  and noting that along the growth 
path 2 2
1 1
=
K Y
K Y  we can substitute (A.5) into (A.4) to derive 11+ g : 
 
1 1
2
1 1 1
1
(1 )((1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 ))1 .
1 (1 )((1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 ))
AKg
K
θ θ
θ θ
pi µ µ pi
pi µ µ pi
− − + − − −
+ = =
+ − − + − − −  (A.6) 
From the perspective of a dictator who survived until second period the optimization program 
amounts to: 
 
3
1
2 2 3 3max ln( ) (1 )(1 ) ln( ),K AK K Kθ piΛ = − + − −  (A.7) 
with 2K  given. 
The first order necessary condition is: 
 
1
2
3 2 3 3
(1 )(1 )10 : 0.
K AK K K
θ pi− −∂Λ
= − + =
∂ −
 (A.8) 
We can rewrite (A.8) as: 
 
1
3 2 3(1 )(1 )( )K AK Kθ pi= − − − , (A.9) 
so that the period 2 growth rate becomes: 
 
1
3
2 1
2
(1 )(1 )1 .
1 (1 )(1 )
AKg
K
θ
θ
pi
pi
− −
+ = =
+ − −  (A.10) 
                                                 
17
  To avoid cluttering the analysis with indices we solve the model in terms of the age of the dictator. 
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Straightforward differentiation of (A.6) and (A.10) then gives the results stated in the text:18 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
 
1
1
21 1
(1 )(1 ) 0.(1 (1 )((1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )))
Ag θ
θ θ
pi
µ pi µ µ pi
− −∂ +
= <
∂ + − − + − − −  (A.11) 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
 
1 1
1
21 1
((1 ) 2(1 )(1 )(1 ))(1 ) 0,(1 (1 )((1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )))
Ag θ θ
θ θ
µ µ pi
pi pi µ µ pi
− − + − − −∂ +
= <
∂ + − − + − − −  (A.12) 
 
1
2
21
(1 )(1 ) 0.(1 (1 )(1 ))
Ag θ
θpi pi
− −∂ +
= <
∂ + − −  (A.13) 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
 
2
1
1
21 1
(1 )( (1 )(1 ))(1 ) 0,(1 (1 )((1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )))
Ag θ
θ θ
pi µ µ pi
θ pi µ µ pi
− + − −∂ +
= >
∂ + − − + − − −  (A.14) 
 
2
1
2
21
(1 )(1 ) 0.(1 (1 )(1 ))
g θ
θ
pi
θ pi
−∂ +
= >
∂ + − −  (A.15) 
                                                 
18
  In order to derive the comparative static effects it is instructive to use the pleasant property that for any 
function of the form 
( , )( , )
1 ( , )
=
+
f x y
g x y
f x y
 it holds that 
( , )( , )
2(1 ( , ))
∂
=
∂ +
f x yg x y x
x f x y
, which can be shown by a 
straightforward application of the quotient rule.  
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Appendix B. Descriptive statistics and data sources 
 
Variable  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Economic growth 4043 1.99 9.09 -65.08 134.13 Heston et al. (2009) 
Economic growth (WDI) 3054 2.15 6.92 -50.05 90.47 Worldbank (2011) 
Age 4021 54.91 12.10 17.00 92.00 Goemans et al. (2009) 
Tenure 4022 9.18 8.34 0.01 46.42 Goemans et al. (2009) 
Political instability 2590 10.50 10.16 1.00 80.52 own calculations 
       Investments (% of GDP) 4114 17.52 12.75 -14.33 80.91 Heston et al. (2009) 
Government expenditures (%of GDP) 4114 19.15 11.65 1.44 83.35 Heston et al. (2009) 
Openess (total trade as % of GDP) 4114 72.80 53.87 1.09 622.63 Heston et al. (2009) 
Civil war 4113 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
Cold war 4583 0.68 0.46 0.00 1.00 own calculation 
       Population growth rate 4347 0.02 0.02 -0.17 0.19 Heston et al. (2009) 
GDP (ln) 4114 8.00 1.06 5.04 11.49 Heston et al. (2009) 
Previous coup attempts (number of) 4583 1.58 2.27 0.00 15.00 Powell and Thyne (2010) 
Previous successful coup attempts (number of) 4583 0.86 1.33 0.00 9.00 Powell and Thyne (2010) 
Regime duration 4055 15.44 17.92 0.00 110.00 Marshall and Jaggers (2011) 
  
